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Abstract
In this paper we investigate wealth inequality/polarization properties related to the support of
the limit distribution of wealth in innovative economies characterized by uninsurable individual
risk. We work out two simple successive generation examples, one with stochastic human capital
accumulation and one with R&D, and prove that intense technological progress makes the support
of the wealth distribution converge to a fractal Cantor-like set. Such limit distribution implies the
disappearance of the middle class, with a “gap” between two wealth clusters that widens as the
growth rate becomes higher. Hence, we claim that in a highly meritocratic world in which the
payoff of the successful individuals is high enough, and in which social mobility is strong, soci-
eties tend to become unequal and polarized. We also show that a redistribution scheme financed
by proportional taxation does not help cure society’s inequality/polarization – on the contrary, it
might increase it – whereas random taxation may well succeed in filling the gap by giving rise to
an artificial middle class, but it hardly makes such class sizeable enough. Finally, we investigate
how disconnection, a typical feature of Cantor-like sets, is related to inequality in the long run.
JEL Classification Numbers: C61, O41
Keywords: Wealth Inequality, Growth, Technological Change, Fractal, Cantor Set, Invariant Dis-
tribution, Polarization, Pulverization.
1 Introduction
How do we predict a fast growing and unequal society’s wealth distribution to look like? In a global
highly competitive and technologically turbulent economy individual success or failure may substan-
tially alter one’s position in the social scale. We argue that societies in a twin peak world would tend
to look like polarized fractals.
This is proved by constructing a simple competitive economy with successive generations and
uninsurable individual risk to show how easily the support of their limit distribution of individual
relative wealth levels can look like a peculiar geometric object called Cantor set, provided that the
exogenous growth rate is high enough. A Cantor set is a fractal on the real line, that is, a totally
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disconnected set with self-similar structure with an evident characteristic: it exhibits a “hole” in
the middle. Our definition of (extreme) inequality is based on such hole, which may obviously be
interpreted as the lack of a middle class, which, in turn, is often identified with the term ‘polarization’
by the mainstream literature on inequality.
Emerging phenomena of income or wealth inequality and polarization has been lately observed
in many economies. For some empirical contributions see, for example, Alesina and Rodrik [4],
Perotti [39], Benabou [11], Benhabib and Spiegel [13], Barro [9] and [10], Forbes [26]. From the
theoretical point of view, the literature on income inequality/polarization appears to be already rich
enough, both from the perspective of the possible consequences that inequality/polarization may have
on growth rates and from the perspective of analyzing what aspects of growth may generate inequal-
ity/polarization. See, for example, Loury [34], Banerjee and Newmann [7], Galor and Zeira [27],
Alesina and Rodrik [4], Persson and Tabellini [40], Benhabib and Rustichini [14], Aghion and Bolton
[1], Benabou [11], Piketty [41], Aghion, Caroli and Garcia-Penalosa [3], Benabou [12].
In this paper, economies with (possibly) polarized wealth distribution in the long run are analyzed
by means of Iterated Function Systems (IFS) to describe their dynamics and their limit distribution.
Even if the IFS approach seems to be capable of unveiling new aspects of economic dynamics, the
application of such methodology to economic models seems to be at an early stage: up to our knowl-
edge, very few works appeared along this line, and none of them with the aim to explain wealth
or income inequality. Some examples are Bhattacharya and Majumdar [15], [16], [17], who dealt
with IFS with random monotone maps, Montrucchio and Privileggi [38], Mitra, Montrucchio and
Privileggi [35], and Mitra and Privileggi [36], [37], who studied stochastic optimal growth models
converging to invariant probabilities supported on fractals.
Our analysis is characterized by markets with equal opportunities for all individuals; such equal
opportunities fuel a strong mobility engine that, if associated to high growth rates, may generate
inequality. Mobility is introduced through stochastic labor income heterogeneity, which represents
the ability of the individuals to adopt better and better technologies. If better technologies entail some
adoption uncertainty at the individual level and if such risk is uninsurable, due to the unobservable
or unverifiable individual commitment into a learning effort, income heterogeneity becomes a natural
consequence of aggregate growth, and the faster the aggregate growth the relatively stronger the
weight of the uncertain part of the individual resources.
A faster growing environment implies stronger family mobility prospects, because a successful
individual from a poor family can more easily overtake the unsuccessful individuals of a richer family,
but it means a tendency for the middle class to disappear as well. Hence a “hole” in the middle of
the support of the wealth distribution is more likely to appear the faster the pace of technological
growth: the wealth distribution becomes polarized into a high and a low wealth classes. However, the
random dynamical system that governs the individual assignment across the ever expanding social
wealth distribution is not only polarizing the wealth distribution, but will mirror the central hole
everywhere through the wealth distribution itself: the absence of a middle class at the social level
implies the absence of “middle subclasses” at all levels, due to the diversity of the destinies of the
different individuals who travel stochastically through the society’s wealth distribution. It follows
that the same process that generates a wealth distribution disconnected in the middle multiplies such
disconnection at infinity – in all its subintervals – generating a totally disconnected support of the
wealth distribution. Therefore we reach what we can call a “pulverized” society. Such a “fractal
society” is an intriguing mix of polarization and pulverization.
This kind of “polarization/pulverization” of the aggregate wealth distribution differs from the
traditional idea of “polarization”: though if we photograph the wealth distribution at each point in
time we get a highly “polarized” picture, when we track the processes for the successive wealth levels
of any single individual we observe a strong mobility. Dynamically, such societies are not polarized in
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“durable classes”, but they show a tremendous impact of mobility. Indeed, it is the amplitude of such
mobility that generates polarization: the very fact that the gains of a lucky poor can make her richer
than an unlucky rich is at the same time an important mobility aspect and the cause of polarization.
We will obtain “fractalized” wealth distributions from two versions of a simple macroeconomic
model with no aggregate uncertainty and individual idiosyncratic income risk. Our specifications
generate enough linearity in the random dynamical system and immediately translate the dynamics
into well known properties of the Barnsley IFS used to generate the Cantor set. The choice of such
a simple (textbook-like) model allows us to examine in depth the most direct relationship between
growth rate and wealth inequality in a dynamic framework.
An important consequence of our main result regards the effect of a fiscal policy aimed at eliminat-
ing polarization/pulverization through income taxation of those who are successful and redistribution
to the unlucky individuals. Intuitively, since such policy directly attacks the mechanism responsi-
ble for the “fractalization” of society, one would expect that this would easily reach its target. We
show that this is not the case. In fact, simple redistribution schemes can never eliminate polariza-
tion/pulverization of society. What’s more, even if the free workings of the private economy itself did
not imply socioeconomic disconnection, a direct taxation of wealth of all individuals may be able to
induce polarization/pulverization of society. Also the adoption of a random taxation scheme, which
has in principle the potential of creating an artificial middle class in a polarized economy, proves
essentially ineffective whenever the incentive compatibility constraint is sufficiently tight.
A closer look at how inequality is being affected by the interplay between pulverization and po-
larization – two apparently contradictory aspects related to the same phenomenon that generates a
Cantor support for the limit distribution – in the long run is given by calculating the limit of the
Gini coefficient of the marginal distributions as time tends to infinity: we find that inequality remains
positive for the invariant wealth distribution.
The main assumption underlying the (stochastic) dynamics in both models under study is that there
are only two states of nature: ‘failure’ or ‘success’. Such framework allows the best outcome under
the low realization to be worse than the worst outcome under the high realization whenever the growth
rate is large enough, as we shall prove in our main result. The choice of such an assumption, if on one
hand plays a key role in establishing a direct relationship between growth and wealth polarization, on
the other hand may appear extreme and unrealistic. At the end of the paper we shall show, by means
of a heuristic but robust argument, that the main idea developed in the ‘two shocks setting’ actually
generalizes to i.i.d. stochastic processes defined by a density – i.e., quite the opposite scenario of
having a “highly discrete” process of only two states – provided that such density is bimodal, in the
sense that it concentrates most of the weight on the boundaries of its state space.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 the two macroeconomic models of technological
change are introduced. Section 3 is devoted to a self-contained review of the basic mathematical meth-
ods we use to analyze the possibly fractal support of the limit distribution for a random dynamical
system. In Section 4 we provide sufficient conditions for the limit wealth distribution to have a Cantor
support, which we interpret as a polarized/pulverized distribution; such conditions are expressed in
terms of (exogenous) growth rate and degree of intergenerational altruism of the population. In Sec-
tion 5 the main implications of the analysis of Section 3 on the inefficacy of inequality-eliminating
policies are reported in detail. In Section 6 we focus on a closer examination of the interplay be-
tween inequality and what we have somewhat tentatively called “pulverization”. Finally, Section 7
shows the robustness of our approach by proving that smooth perturbations of our discrete stochastic
process do not affect the main result. Section 8 concludes with some comments, while the Appendix
A contains the proof of the main result of Section 6 and Appendix B explains the formula for the
approximation in Section 7.
3
2 Technology and Growth
In this section we introduce two simple macroeconomic models with exogenously evolving technol-
ogy. In the first one, we assume a sequence of successive generations of altruistic individuals who take
a consumption and bequest decision on their wealth accumulated out of a stochastic income acquired
at the utility cost of learning a technology that is new at every generation. The second model hinges
on the same framework of the first one, but allows for exploitation of new discoveries by means of
patents which expire after one generation. Both models are characterized by a strong mobility engine
(equal opportunities for all individuals) and uninsurable individual risk. Unlike the mainstream liter-
ature, no imperfections on credit markets or barriers to access education are assumed. On the other
hand, uncertainty is modeled in a standard fashion, similar to that adopted in Aghion and Bolton [1]:
there are only two states of nature describing achievements of economic agents, either ‘success’, with
probability 0 < p < 1, or ‘failure’, with probability 1− p.
2.1 Adoption of New Technologies
Consider an infinite horizon discrete time economy with a continuum of infinitely lived families that
will be indexed by i. With no loss of generality we shall normalize population over the unit interval,
i.e., i ∈ [0, 1]. Each family is formed by a one-period lived altruistic individuals whose preferences
are represented by the following “warm glow” (see Andreoni [5]) utility function
u (c, b, e) = c1−βbβ − e
where c > 0 denotes end-of-life consumption, b > 0 the bequest left to the unique heir, e ≥ 0 a
learning effort,1 and 0 < β < 1 the degree of intergenerational altruism. As, for example, in Banerjee
and Newman [7], Galor and Zeira [27], or Piketty [41], such Cobb-Douglas altruistic preferences
imply that a fraction β of each individual’s end of life wealth will be passed over to her child. Hence,
the indirect utility of end-of-life wealth W is linear (risk neutral preferences) and equal to
U (W ) = (1− β)1−β ββW − e.
The end-of-life wealth W of each family is uncertain at the beginning of each generation: it
depends on the wealth level inherited from the past, that is on the bequest left by the ancestor, and on
individual success in learning the technology that becomes available during her lifetime.
Individuals of generation t are endowed with one unit of labor time which they will inelastically
use to produce a perishable consumption good at the common productivity level At > 0. At the
beginning of period t, a new General Purpose Technology (see Helpman [28]) appears exogenously
and every individual has to learn it in order to successfully enter production. Learning technology
At requires an effort that entails a certain utility cost et > 0. Whether an individual exerts the
required effort for learning such technology is something that cannot be observed by anybody but the
individual.2 Moreover “success” in the adoption of the technology is not sure, but it occurs to each
individual with probability 0 < p < 1 constant through time, independently of all other individuals.
In other words, all individuals of the same generation face the same opportunity of success. Since the
(exertion of) learning effort is unobservable, borrower-creditor interaction lasts one period only and
individual’s offspring cannot be sanctioned; accordingly, no idiosyncratic risk can be insured.
1As will become clear later, each agent chooses to exert effort e between two values: zero and a strictly positive fixed
amount which depends on time.
2Specifically, it is not the amount of learning effort which is not observable, but whether an individual undertakes such
effort at all.
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Technology is assumed to evolve exogenously: At = γAt−1, where γ > 1. Consistently, we will
assume that et = γet−1, that is, learning a more advanced technology requires more effort.
Provided that individual i ∈ [0, 1] alive in period t undertakes the learning effort et at the beginning
of her life, her end-of-period income Yt will be:
Y it =
{
0 with probability 1− p
At with probability p
(1)
Notice that in this model income derives from the “ability” in the use of current technologies and
entails no utility loss.
The evolution of technology yields At = γtA0 and that of effort et = γte0, with both A0 and e0
strictly positive. Individual i wealth at the beginning of her life in period t is given by the bequest
inherited from period t− 1:
bit = βW
i
t−1,
where W it−1 represents the wealth accumulated by her ancestor at the end of time t − 1. Provided
that individual i will perform effort et in order to learn technology At, her expected indirect utility
conditional to the past wealth and the performed effort is given by
E
[
U
(
W it
)
|
(
W it−1, et
)]
= (1− β)1−β ββE
[
W it |W
i
t−1
]
− et
= (1− β)1−β ββ
[
p
(
βW it−1 + At
)
+ (1− p) βW it−1
]
− et (2)
= (1− β)1−β ββ
(
βW it−1 + pAt
)
− et
where the probability of success p in adopting technology At does not depend on time.
We shall assume the following.
Assumption 1
0 < e0 < (1− β)
1−β ββpA0.
Assumption 1 implies that the expected indirect utility obtained by exerting effort et is greater
than the certain effort for all t ≥ 0, thus rational individuals will always put the required effort into
learning the new technology. It follows that the intergenerational motion of the wealth of family
i ∈ [0, 1] is described by
W it =
{
βW it−1 with probability 1− p
βW it−1 + At with probability p.
(3)
Let bi0 ≥ 0 denote the “original” bequest available at the beginning of period t = 0 to family i, then
W i0 =
{
bi0 with probability 1− p
bi0 + A0 with probability p
Since At grows exogenously through time, the random dynamical system (3) described by the two
maps f1 (W ) = βW and f2 (W ) = βW + At evolves along increasing sets of possible wealths. In
particular, at the end of period t generation i will be endowed with some wealth W it in the interval[
βbi0, βb
i
0 +
(
1− (β/γ)t+1
γ − β
)
γt+1A0
]
(4)
which, since γ > 1, 0 < β < 1 and A0 > 0, diverges to [0,+∞) as t→ +∞.
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However, notice that, since 0 < β < 1, both f1 and f2 in (3) are contractions in the variable
W , that is, wealth grows only thanks to technological parameter At as time elapses. Hence, a better
highlighting of the features of this dynamics can be obtained by transforming system (3) into an
equivalent law of motion adjusted by the productivity level At, which turns out to be contractive and
thus describes a process that eventually remains bounded inside some compact set, which we shall
call trapping region.
Dividing (3) by At we get the equivalent system in terms of wit = W it /At:
wit =
{
(β/γ)wit−1 with probability 1− p
(β/γ)wit−1 + 1 with probability p
(5)
whose trapping region, as can be easily shown, is the interval
[
0, (1− (β/γ))−1
]
. Let
α =
β
γ
, (6)
which implies 0 < α < 1, and consider the linear transformation yit = (1− α)wit of (5). With this
change of variable we obtain the following productivity-adjusted dynamic:
yit =
{
αyit−1 with probability 1− p
αyit−1 + (1− α) with probability p,
(7)
which, as we shall see more in detail in Section 3.3, has the unit interval [0, 1] as trapping region.
The stochastic dynamic (7) defines two possible levels of (productivity adjusted) wealth at time
t of individual i, yit, provided that her wealth at time t − 1 is yit−1. The lower level is reached with
probability 1− p while the upper level is reached with probability of success p.
System (7) belongs to an important family of random dynamical systems known in the literature
as (Hyperbolic) Iterated Function Systems (IFS). Before studying thoroughly IFS (7), which is the
topic of Section 3, we turn our attention to a second, slightly more sophisticated, model, mainly to
show that dynamics of the form expressed in (7) can be easily replicated.
2.2 Schumpeterian Growth with Patents
While keeping the same framework of Section 2.1, let us now assume that every individual of gen-
eration t at the beginning of her economic life has the same probability 0 < p < 1 of discovering a
better production method that allows the productivity of a number θ ≥ 1 of individuals to jump to
the new technological frontier At = γAt−1, provided she undertook an indivisible innovation effort
et = γet−1.
To render growth endogenous we will assume that productivity growth rate γ is an increasing and
bounded3 function of the aggregate innovative effort
∫ 1
0
ei0di, where 1 is the constant (normalized)
population size.4 Inventions are immediately patented and the patents expire after one generation.
We will assume that each individual can run only one research project during her life. Hence we are
building a simple Schumpeterian model in which the entrepreneurs are new people (Schumpeter [42]
and [43]) who try to adapt the ever-evolving society knowledge frontier to their sphere of production,
as in Aghion and Howitt [2] and Howitt [29]. The parallel with Aghion and Howitt ([2], Ch. 3) and
Howitt [29] cross-sector spillover is in our assumption that At evolves as an increasing function of
3With this simple assumption – that may be motivated by some kinds of congestion effects – we eliminate Jones [31]
scale effects.
4It would not be difficult to allow for population growth. Interestingly, as will become clearer throughout the paper,
offspring’s division of bequest would reinforce inequality in this model and/or even generate it.
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social R&D adoption effort. This adds a zero growth equilibrium due to R&D coordination failure: if
each individual expects nobody to exert effort she will be better off not exerting it. In the rest of the
analysis we will concentrate only on the positive growth equilibrium.
Unlike usual Schumpeterian models we are here assuming a limited productive capacity per firms
and/or a limited number of patent licensees. In fact we will assume that in order to implement each
successful innovation the cooperation of θ workers (including the innovator) is necessary. Hence, by
the law of large numbers, in the steady state there will be a fraction p of innovators, and a fraction pθ
of individuals employed in all innovative productive processes. Since we keep the whole population
normalized to 1, in order to let all innovators carry on their activity, the fraction pθ of employed
individuals cannot exceed 1, that is, the number of workers for each activity must be bounded by
1 ≤ θ ≤
1
p
. (8)
If the RHS of (8) holds with equality, the society is perfectly divided in a fraction p of entrepre-
neurs/ innovators and a fraction 1− p of workers. If the RHS of (8) holds with strict inequality, then
there will be a fraction of people who will be treated as self-employed in production processes that
use the technology At−1 available from the last period. Since patents expire after one period, the
technology At−1, available only for the innovators at time t− 1, becomes of public domain at time t.
Therefore we shall assume that, at each period t, both employed workers in the innovative sectors and
self-employed workers in the old sectors perceive salaries equal to their productivity under the old
technology At−1. In this last scenario there will be a fraction 0 < pθ < 1 of individuals employed in
the At technology sector and a fraction 1− pθ of individuals employed in the At−1 technology sector.
Of these families, only a fraction p is able to reap the benefits of the innovative technology At (each
by employing θ−1 workers) by means of patents, while the other fraction 1−p, being them employed
in the innovative sector or self-employed in the old sector, is remunerated by the productivity of the
At−1 technology.5
The innovations of this model can alternatively be interpreted as the discovery of an “entrepre-
neurial talent” that allows the innovator to found a firm that allows a more efficient use of θ workers
by making them use the best productive practices available in her firm. In this sense, the model of this
section can be viewed as an education model of the firm: in the particular case θ = 1 the individual
is only able to privately accumulate the “state of the art” human capital. Unlike the previous exam-
ple, the technology learned by generation t will be observed by everybody when it is operated, and,
afterwards, every family will become able to use it at no additional educational cost. With θ = 1 this
model depicts an economy similar to that of the previous example, except for a perfect educational
spillover which allows the wealth of the children of the unlucky generation to instantaneously reach
the level of the lucky members of the previous cohort.
Let us turn our attention to the evolution of wealth through time in this model. In every period, p
“innovators” will appear and pθ ≤ 1 skilled workers will be producing with the cutting-edge technol-
ogy, paying their extra productivity to each successful innovator. The innovator – as a patent holder
or as an entrepreneur – is able to extract the complete productivity increment for one period, thereby
rendering the appropriable technology of every non-innovator equal to the same value At−1. In other
words, besides directly benefitting from the new technology At, each single innovator in period t can
appropriate the productivity gains of the non-innovators workers employed in her firm. Her end-of-
period income is thus equal to
At + (At − At−1) (θ − 1) = [1 + θ (γ − 1)]At−1. (9)
5If θ > 1/p, the innovators would not be able to implement their discoveries, and in a competitive equilibrium all
profits would be zero, leading to a society with a unique wealth group without inequality.
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Hence, the wealth of family i at the end of period t, provided she undertook the indivisible inno-
vation effort et at the beginning of the period, will be
W it =
{
βW it−1 + At−1 with probability 1− p
βW it−1 + [1 + θ (γ − 1)]At−1 with probability p.
(10)
The unlucky will get only the one-period lagged productivityAt−1 wealth, being her self-employed or
employed by some patent holder firm; in the latter case she must pay the full monopolistic rent to the
successful patent holder who employs her, though she can choose between different patent holders.
Once again, we need to make sure that all families find it convenient to undertake the indivisible
innovation effort et at the beginning of each period t. The individual i expected utility gain conditional
on effort et is given by
E
[
U
(
Y it
)
|et
]
= pρ [1 + θ (γ − 1)]At−1 + (1− p) ρAt−1 − et
= ρ [1 + pθ (γ − 1)]At−1 − et,
where ρ = (1− β)1−β ββ, while the individual i certain utility gain obtained by exerting zero effort
is given by
U (At−1) = ρAt−1.
To achieve our goal,
E
[
U
(
Y it
)
|et
]
> U (At−1)
must hold, which easily translates into the next assumption.
Assumption 2
0 < e0 < ρθ (1− 1/γ) pA0.
where ρ = (1− β)1−β ββ.
Notice that in this case nobody ends up with a zero wealth, but instead even the “poorest” segment
of the population improves its standards of living at the same steady rate γ − 1 as the richest. In
particular, at the end of period t each individual i will have some wealth W it laying in the interval[
βbi0 +
(
1− (β/γ)t+1
γ − β
)
γtA0, βb
i
0 +
(
1− (β/γ)t+1
γ − β
)
γt [1 + θ (γ − 1)]A0
]
.
This is a consequence of the temporary nature of patents that allows the inventors to “exploit” the un-
lucky only for a limited lapse of time and, upon expiry, makes that innovation available for everybody
to be freely used.
Following the same technique as in Section 2.1, divide both equations in (10) by At to get the
productivity-adjusted dynamic
wit =
{
αwit−1 + 1/γ with probability 1− p
αwit−1 + [1 + θ (γ − 1)] /γ with probability p,
(11)
where α = β/γ. Through the affine transformation yit = [θ (γ − 1)]
−1 [γ (1− α)wit − 1] of (11), it is
immediately seen that we obtain the same IFS as in (7), which takes the relevant values on the interval
[0, 1].
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3 Iterated Function Systems and their Attractor
In this section we provide a self-contained description of the mathematical toolkit necessary to handle
IFS of the kind defined in (7). We shall confine our attention to IFS constituted by maps which are
contractions, since we heavily rely on a basic result on convergence of IFS requiring this property.
Then, we shall generalize the idea of normalizing linear dynamics over a compact interval (specifi-
cally, [0, 1]) already used in the previous sections, and we shall carefully study the geometric proper-
ties of the the fixed point – the attractor – of such normalized IFS. On these geometric properties is
based the definition of wealth polarization/pulverization that will be used in subsequent sections.
3.1 A Well Known Result on IFS
There is a huge literature available on IFS, which has grown very fast since, a few decades ago,
it proved useful in techniques for generating approximated images of fractals on computer screens.
Exhaustive treatment can be found, among others, in [30], [8], [22], [25], [47], [44], [32] and [24]. For
a simplified exposition, focused on discussing an optimal growth model exhibiting the same dynamics
as in (7), see also [35].
Consider a pair of maps f1 : X → X , f2 : X → X , where X is some compact subset of R, so that
f1 < f2 and some constant 0 < αj < 1 exists such that |fj (x)− fj (y)| ≤ αj |x− y| for all x, y ∈ X
and j = 1, 2. Given any fixed probability 0 < p < 1, the triple {f1, f2, p} defines the (contractive)
IFS
xt =
{
f1 (xt−1) with probability 1− p
f2 (xt−1) with probability p.
(12)
on the compact set X . System (12) induces an operator T on R, called Barnsley operator, defined by
T (B) = f1 (B) ∪ f2 (B) , B ⊆ X, (13)
where fj (B) denotes the image ofB through fj , j = 1, 2. Successive iterations of T transform B into
a sequence of sets Bt = T [T t−1 (B)] through time. We are interested in properties of the limiting set,
if it exists, to which the sequence Bt might eventually converge. A set A ⊆ X is called an invariant
set or attractor for (12) if it is compact and satisfies
T (A) = A.
It is a set such that, once entered by the IFS, successive iterations of T keep the system inside it.
Since (12) describes a stochastic dynamical system, another important aspect of the IFS is the
evolution through time of marginal probability distributions. Given any initial distribution ν0 over
X , it is interesting to study how this probability evolves following the IFS. Let B be the σ-algebra
of Borel measurable subsets of X and P the space of probability measures on (X,B). Define the
Markov operator M : P → P as
Mν (B) = (1− p) ν
[
f−11 (B)
]
+ pν
[
f−12 (B)
]
, for all B ∈ B (14)
where ν ∈ P and f−1j (B) denotes the preimage set {x ∈ X : fj (x) ∈ B}, j = 1, 2. Operator M
is often called Foias operator. As we did for operator T , we want to study successive iterations of
M starting from some initial probability ν0, νt (B) = M [M t−1ν0 (B)], which yields the evolution of
marginal probabilities of the system as time elapses. A probability distribution ν∗ ∈ P is said to be
invariant with respect to M if
ν∗ = Mν∗. (15)
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An invariant probability distribution is usually interpreted in economics as the stochastic steady state
to which the economy eventually might converge starting from some initial distribution ν0 (see for
example [45] and [38]).
Here is the main result available for the fixed point of our IFS. Recall that the support of a prob-
ability distribution ν is the smallest closed set S ⊆ X such that ν (S) = 1, and that a sequence νt of
probabilities converges weakly to ν∗ if lim
t→∞
∫
fdνt =
∫
fdν∗ for every bounded continuous function
f : R → R.
Theorem 1 Consider the IFS described by {f1, f2, p}.
i) There is a unique attractor for the IFS; that is, a unique compact set A ⊆ X , such that f1 (A) ∪
f2 (A) = A.
ii) There is a unique probability distribution ν∗ on (X,B) satisfying the functional equation (15),
that is,
ν∗ (B) = (1− p) ν∗
[
f−11 (B)
]
+ pν∗
[
f−12 (B)
] for all B ∈ B. (16)
iii) A is the support of ν∗ and, for any probability6 ν0 on (X,B), the sequence νt = M tν0 for
t = 0, 1, 2, . . ., converges weakly to ν∗.
The original proof relies on a contraction mapping argument and dates back to Hutchinson [30].
See also Falconer [25] and Lasota and Mackey [32] for further discussion.
3.2 Scaling Maps
Consider the IFS (12) and assume that the maps f1, f2 are increasing. Let a and b be their fixed
points respectively, that is, f1 (a) = a and f2 (b) = b, as in figure 1. Since the maps f1, f2 are both
contractions, it is readily seen that, as time elapses, values xt that are admissible eventually must lay
inside the interval [a, b], that is, [a, b] is the trapping region of (12). In other words, the portion of the
maps f1, f2 which is relevant in the long run is included in the square T in figure 1 (where the plots
of f1 and f2 are in bold). Hence, with no loss of generality, we may let X = [a, b].
For any increasing contractive maps f1, f2, such relevant region can be “normalized” over the
interval [0, 1] (that is, the square T can be transformed into the square N in figure 1) by the following
two transformations:
1. by a rigid translation towards the origin, so that the fixed point a becomes the origin itself, and
2. by scaling the whole system by a factor k = b− a.
The outcome of such transformation is a new IFS
yt =
{
g1 (yt−1) with probability 1− p
g2 (yt−1) with probability p
(17)
where the maps gj are given by
gj (y) = k
−1 [fj (ky + a)− a] , j = 1, 2, (18)
6To be precise, weak convergence holds for any initial probability ν such that
∫
|x− a| dν <∞ for some constant a.
See Section 2.1.2 in [35] for more details.
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with k = b − a, as can be easily checked. Figure 1 illustrates this translation/scaling procedure
that transforms the original relevant region T into the new “normalized” relevant region N , which
is the unit square. Such normalization can be generalized to maps f1 < f2 that are not necessarily
monotone,7 see Cozzi and Privileggi [19] for details.
0 1
1
a
a
b
b
g1
g2
f1
f2
N
T
FIGURE 1: normalization of two contractive maps f1, f2 over the unit square.
Transformations that are translations and scaling are called similarities (see [25], pp. 7 and 8).
A similarity has the property of transforming sets into geometrically similar ones, in the sense that
it preserves relative distances between points of the original set; formally, it is a transformation S :
R
n→ Rn such that |S (x)− S (y)| = k |x− y| for all x, y ∈ Rn and some constant ratio or scale
k > 0. Therefore, by construction, the IFS (17) obtained through (18), has graph similar to the graph
of the original IFS (12); this can be easily checked by noting that the graphs inside the squares T and
N in figure 1 are themselves similar. With a slight abuse of terminology, we shall say that the IFS
(12) and (17) are similar.
An important consequence of the normalization procedure described above is that the invariant
sets of both (12) and (17) have the same geometric properties, as they are generated by similar sys-
tems. Thus, similar IFS have similar attractors, and studying the geometric features of the attractor of
the normalized IFS (17) is equivalent to studying the geometry of (12).
3.3 Normalized Linear IFS
If the maps fj are linear and with same slope 0 < α < 1, that is, of the form
xt =
{
αxt−1 + z1 with probability 1− p
αxt−1 + z2 with probability p,
(19)
7To be precise, at least in the study of inequality phenomena, also the contractivity property could be relaxed some-
where in the “relevant region” (the square T in figure 1). The only minimum requirement is that the graphics of f1, f2 do
not intersect inside this area and that the maps are contractions outside such area, so that the system is being attracted to
the interval [a, b] as time elapses.
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where z1, z2 are any constants such that z1 < z2, then a = z1/ (1− α), b = z2/ (1− α) and (18)
becomes the affine transformation
gj (y) = αy + (1− α)
zj − z1
z2 − z1
, j = 1, 2, (20)
which transforms IFS (19) into the similar one
yt =
{
αyt−1 with probability 1− p
αyt−1 + (1− α) with probability p
(21)
defined on X = [0, 1]. Figure 2 illustrates why interval [0, 1] is the trapping region of the contractive
system (21): 0 is the fixed point of the map g1 (y) = αy and 1 is the fixed point of the map g2 (y) =
αy + (1− α); since, at each period, the system “jumps” from one map to the other with probabilities
1− p and p respectively, it must eventually remain “trapped” between 0 and 1.
0 1
1
yt
yt+1
g1
g2
FIGURE 2: X = [0, 1] is the trapping region of system (21), where g1(y) = αy + (1− α) and g2(y) = αy.
Notice that (20) provides an alternative – and more general – tool to obtain the normalized IFS (7)
from the two (apparently) different systems (5) and (11) in Sections 2.1 and 2.2 respectively, where
we used a direct change of variable instead.
Remark 1 For what follows, it is important to stress that the affine transform (20) does not affect
the slope α of the maps fj of the original linear IFS (19). Hence, since (19) and (21) are similar,
parameter α completely characterize linear IFS, independently of additive constants z1 and z2. The
(similarity) transformation (20) neutralizes the effect of z1 and z2. We can therefore conclude that
also the geometric properties of both attractors depend uniquely on parameter α, i.e., the common
slope α of both pairs gj and fj , and not on the additive constants z1 and z2.
Thus, we are entitled to concentrate our analysis exclusively on IFS (21) – or, equivalently, on
the IFS (7) – over the unit interval, X = [0, 1]. To see how parameter α (and not additive constants)
affects the whole geometry of IFS (21), observe that the graphs of g1 and g2 are two increasing parallel
lines crossing the lower left and the upper right vertex of the unit square [0, 1]2 respectively: the larger
α (close to 1) the steeper and the closer they are, the lower α the flatter and the more apart they are.
Check (in this order) figures 3, 2 and 4 to grasp how these graphs change as values of α decrease.
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3.4 Geometric Properties of the Attractor
It is important to emphasize some features of the attractor A of the IFS (21) – the support of its
invariant distribution – which depend only on contraction factor α and are independent of probability
p. This will provide a key ingredient for our definition of wealth polarization/pulverization.
A quick glance at figure 2 makes clear that the support of our IFS will be the whole interval [0, 1]
whenever 1/2 ≤ α < 1. This is because T ([0, 1]) = g1 ([0, 1])∪ g2 ([0, 1]) = [0, 1] if the images of g1
and g2 overlap, that is, if 1/2 ≤ α < 1, as figure 3 shows. In this case we shall say that all marginal
distributions νt, and thus also the invariant distribution ν∗, have “full support”.
0 1
1
yt
yt+1
g1
g2
FIGURE 3: g1([0, 1]) ∪ g2([0, 1]) = [0, 1] when 1/2 ≤ α < 1.
More interesting is the case when images g1 ([0, 1]) and g2 ([0, 1]) do not overlap: this happens for
0 < α < 1/2, since g1 ([0, 1])∪g2 ([0, 1]) = [0, α]∪ [1− α, 1], where [0, α] and [1− α, 1] are disjoint.
For α < 1/2, there is a “gap” between the two image sets, with amplitude
h (α) = 1− 2α > 0. (22)
Note that h (α) is decreasing in α, and the gap “spreads” through the unit interval by successive
applications of the maps gj, reproducing itself, scaled down by a factor 1/α, in the middle of each
subinterval born after each step t. Figure 4 reproduces the first three iterations of (21) starting from
[0, 1], generating a union of 8 (= 23) intervals of length α3.
By pushing these iterations to the limit, we eventually find an attractor with features of the usual
Cantor ternary set; in fact, for α = 1/3, the support is precisely the Cantor ternary set. Cantor-like sets
of the kind constructed by computing limt→∞ T t ([0, 1]) for 0 < α < 1/2 exhibit several geometrical
properties that are typical of fractals.
The most bewildering – and intriguing – feature of fractals is the need of a more sophisticated tool
than the topological dimension – which allows only for integer values – to measure the “consistency”
of their structure. Several dimensions has been constructed for this purpose, like, among others, the
Hausdorff dimension, the Box-counting dimension and the Similarity dimension (for a discussion
on dimensions see, for example, [25]). All fractals have the peculiarity that their dimension is a
“fraction”, from which the name “fractal”; for instance, Cantor-like sets which are the attractors of
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(21) for 0 < α < 1/2 have Hausdorff dimension − ln 2/ lnα (positive but less than 1), which, in this
case, is the same as the Box-counting and the Similarity dimensions.
0 1
1
y0
y1
g1
g2
(a)
0 1
1
y1
y2
g1
g2
(b)
0 1
1
y2
y3
g1
g2
(c)
FIGURE 4: first three iterations of our IFS for α < 1/2 starting from [0, 1]. The third iteration gives a union of
eight intarvals of length α3, as can be seen on the vertical axis in (c).
Whenever α < 1/2, the attractor of (21) has dimension less than 1, which implies that it is totally
disconnected, that is, between any two points there are “holes” (points laying outside the attractor).
Conversely, even if dimensions less than 1 denote sets with very “disperse” points, it can be shown
by means of a standard Cantor diagonal argument that Cantor-like sets contain uncountably many
points, which are all pulverized across the interval itself (in the mathematical literature they are often
referred as “Cantor dust”). Nonetheless, none of these points are isolated, i.e., all Cantor-like sets have
the paradoxical property that they are both totally disconnected and perfect. A terse and accessible
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discussion of the Cantor ternary set and its properties can be found in Chapter 11 in [46]. Also [20]
is a good reference for an introductory approach.
3.5 The Invariant Distribution
Properties of the attractor A discussed before shed some light also on the limiting distribution sup-
ported on it. A subset of R with dimension less than 1 have Lebesgue measure zero.8 Since A is the
support of the invariant distribution ν∗, ν∗ (A) = 1, from which we deduce that ν∗ turns out to be
singular with respect to Lebesgue measure whenever α < 1/2. However, singular invariant distribu-
tions are not confined to the case α < 1/2, as it is widely discussed in [35], where singularity versus
absolute continuity properties of ν∗ are systematically investigated.
To have a flavor of what such an invariant distribution might look like, one may draw some itera-
tions of Foias operator9 M defined as in (14) starting from the uniform distribution over [0, 1]. This,
in the case 0 < α < 1/2, is equivalent to the following construction. Split a unit mass so that the
right interval of T ([0, 1]) has mass p and the left interval has mass 1 − p. Then, divide the mass on
each interval of T ([0, 1]) between the two subintervals of T 2 ([0, 1]) in the ratio p/ (1− p). Continue
in this way, so that the mass on each interval of T t ([0, 1]) is divided in the ratio p/ (1− p) between
its two subintervals in T t+1 ([0, 1]) (see also Example 17.1 in [25]). Figure 5 depicts some iterations
of M using this construction starting from the uniform distribution for α = 1/3 and p = 1/3.
Figure 6 shows two examples of eight iterations of M in the overlapping case, i.e. for α ≥
1/2, when the invariant distribution ν∗ has full support. Note that for α close to 1 [high “degree
of overlapping” of the images g1 ([0, 1]) and g2 ([0, 1])] and p sufficiently close to 1/2, figure 6(a)
suggests that ν∗ will be “smooth” (absolutely continuous); while, whenever α gets closer to 1/2 and
p gets closer to the extrema 0 or 1, as in figure 6(b), the approximation resembles the traits observed
in figure 5(f), where the limiting distribution is known to be singular.
We end this section by noting that Theorem 1 applied to our IFS (21) provides also some standard
information on the limiting distribution ν∗. Denote by y∗ ∈ [0, 1] the random variable associated to
the invariant distribution ν∗, that is, let y∗ be the random fixed point10 of system (21). Then, functional
equation (16) can be rewritten as
ν∗ (y∗ ∈ B) = (1− p) ν∗
(
y∗
α
∈ B
)
+ pν∗
(
y∗
α
−
1− α
α
∈ B
)
,
which allows for a direct computation of expectation and variance of y∗:
E (y∗) = p (23)
V ar (y∗) =
1− α
1 + α
p (1− p) . (24)
Note that these computations are justified thanks to weak convergence, since expectation and variance
are the integrals of the identity function f (y) = y and the function f (y) = [y − Eg (y)]2 respectively,
which are both bounded and continuous on [0, 1].
4 Growth and Inequality
The stochastic dynamic model expressed by (7), or more generally by (21), turns out to be especially
useful for a slightly different interpretation, which is the main focus of this paper. One-period proba-
8A rigorous proof of this fact, which uses the notion of Hausdorff measure, can be found in [22].
9The Maple code that generates plots like in figure 5 is available from the authors upon request.
10See Arnold [6] for a detailed treatment of random dynamical systems and random fixed points.
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1
2
(a) M1
0 1
2
4
(b) M2
0 1
4
8
(c) M3
0 1
8
16
(d) M4
0 1
16
32
(e) M5
0 1
32
64
(f) M6
FIGURE 5: first six iterations of operator M starting from the uniform probability for α = 1/3 and p = 1/3.
bility p of individual i of successfully adopting technology At at the end of period t – or discovering
some innovative production method in the Shumpeterian version of the model – can be seen, by the
law of large numbers, as the “average proportion of the whole population” that in the long run is able
to catch the opportunity of benefitting from the (constantly evolving) new technology. In this scenario,
the IFS (21) describes the evolution through time of the wealth distribution across a population of a
continuum of individuals normalized to 1, which, by Theorem 1, in the long run converges to some
invariant wealth distribution ν∗ supported on a subset of [0, 1].
From this aggregate perspective, expectation (23) can be read as the average productivity-adjusted
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0 1
1
2
(a) α = 4/5 and p = 1/3
0 1
12
24
(b) α = 3/5 and p = 1/8
FIGURE 6: two examples of the first eight iterations of Foias operator M starting from the uniform probability
in the overlapping case, that is, for α ≥ 1/2.
wealth in the steady state, and variance (24) as the dispersion of individual wealths. From (23)
it is immediately seen that the higher the individual probability p of exploiting technology At (or
successfully innovating), the “richer” the economy on average; while (24) shows that low values of
parameter α = β/γ (i.e., low altruism rate β or high exogenous growth rate γ) and values of parameter
p close to 1/2, entail a dispersed invariant wealth distribution ν∗. Index (24) provides a very rough
measure of wealth inequality; incidentally, note that, for any fixed value of probability of success p,
the lower parameter α, the more dispersed the (steady state) wealth distribution.
In view of Section 3, we are in the position of saying much more on the steady state of such kind
of economy. Specifically, we focus on the existence of a middle class, which is often considered
important for growth itself, for democracy, for sociopolitical stability, and for the law and order, as
quantified, among others, in the empirical analyses of Alesina and Rodrik [4], Perotti [39] and Barro
[9]. A strong middle class in our economy is represented by an invariant distribution ν∗ that gathers
a proportionally larger fraction of the population around 1/2 than close to the extrema 0 and 1 of the
interval [0, 1]. Our main result, Proposition 1, provides clear-cut conditions for the converse, the lack
of a middle class, thus characterizing economies which are polarized in terms of wealth distribution.
The self-contained description of such steady state in terms of attractor of the IFS (21) carried
out in Section 3.4 makes clear the relationship between values of parameter α and the very existence
of a middle class: economies featuring values α < 1/2 for the exogenous parameter α = β/γ have
the striking property that a middle class disappears already after one period starting from any wealth
distribution ν0 on [0, 1]. Such disappearance is graphically represented by the “gap” between the
two disjoint image sets g1 ([0, 1]) and g2 ([0, 1]) in figure 4(a): already the first marginal distribution
ν1 concentrates wealth on two disjoint classes regardless of the wealth distribution ν0 on [0, 1] in
t = 0. Furthermore, this gap is doomed to stay there forever, that is, also the limiting (steady state)
wealth distribution ν∗ turns out to be characterized by the same lack of a middle class. Note that,
as we observed in Section 3.4, this happens independently of the probability of success p, and the
size of the gap increases as parameter α decreases, which is consistent with the measure of dispersion
provided by (24). Since the lack of a middle class can be seen as an extreme case of wealth inequality,
accordingly to the literature on inequality we shall refer to it with the term wealth polarization.11
11We shall see in Section 6 that the term polarization becomes problematic whenever a more technical definition of
polarization is needed for distributions supported on Cantor sets. Throughout most part of this paper, we shall employ the
term polarization to identify whatever wealth distribution characterized by a missing middle class, as formalized in the
next Definition 1.
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Moreover, we have seen in Section 3.4, that whenever the images sets g1 ([0, 1]) and g2 ([0, 1]) are
disjoint, after the first iteration of the IFS the hole appearing in the support of the marginal wealth
distribution ν1 is being infinitely replicated on smaller scale in all supports of the successive marginal
distributions νt, t ≥ 2, leading in the limit to a support for the invariant distribution ν∗ which is a
Cantor-like set. This phenomenon creates a form of intra-class social disconnection that we somewhat
tentatively will label wealth pulverization.
The discussion above leads to the following definition of wealth polarization/pulverization based
on the (no) overlapping property of the image sets of the maps g1 and g2 of the IFS (21).
Definition 1 Consider any economy of the type described in Section 2, where (productivity adjusted)
wealth distribution through time is described by the IFS {g1, g2, p} defined as in (21) on X = [0, 1].
We shall say that such economy is polarized/pulverized whenever12
g1 (1) < g2 (0) . (25)
A direct application of Definition 1 leads to our main result.
Proposition 1 Under Assumption 1 for the model introduced in Section 2.1, and condition (8) plus
Assumption 2 for the model described in Section 2.2, if γ > 2β the support A of the limit distribution
ν∗ of both economies is a Cantor-like set, and thus they are polarized/pulverized in the long run.13
Moreover, the larger γ (and the smaller β), the larger the gap between the fractions of the population
– the the “poor” and “rich” – near the extremes of the interval [0, 1], independently of the values of
parameters p and θ.
Proof. Since α = β/γ, γ > 2β ⇐⇒ α < 1/2, which itself is equivalent to (25). The latter
statement follows from (22), which measures the size of the gap between the “poor” and the “rich”
fractions of the population as a decreasing function of α = β/γ.
Proposition 1 shows that a high economic growth rate, by rewarding the successful individuals and
penalizing in relative terms those who are not ready to catch the opportunities associated with the new
technologies, make the middle class disappear and polarize society in two different wealth classes.
Polarization becomes dramatic the larger the jump in productivity γ and the smaller the individual
degree of altruism β (or, equivalently, the more selfish the individuals).
Remark 2 It is important to highlight that a polarized wealth distribution does not mean that wealth
classes are trapping the individuals: all individuals have the same opportunity to become rich or poor
in this economy and it is precisely the amplitude of the social mobility – and not the frequency, that
is the probability p of catching the technological opportunity, or finding some innovative production
method – that generates wealth polarization.
5 Redistribution and Social Cohesion
It turns out that normalizing maps of IFS as in (19) on the interval [0, 1] has important policy impli-
cations. Specifically, redistribution schemes based on lump-sum transfers from the rich to the poor
12For a discussion of the no overlap property (25) applied to stochastic optimal growth models of the Brock and Mirman
[18] type, see [36] and [37].
13Condition γ > 2β is both necessary and sufficient for the attractor A to be a Cantor set. However it is clearly only
sufficient for polarization, since, generally speaking, an invariant distribution may well have full support and at the same
time exhibiting some degree of polarization – e.g., by concentrating all the weight close to the extrema of [0, 1].
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aimed at doing away with social polarization/pulverization are not capable of achieving such goal,
while direct wealth taxation may even make polarization worse. This happens because the “hole” that
generates polarization depends only on parameters β (preferences) and γ (growth rate), as it has been
widely argued in the previous sections, and cannot be affected by mere transfers of income, as the
latter simply translate into different values for constants z1, z2 in system (19).
This result appears counter-intuitive at a first glance. We shall devote the next sections to analyze
in detail whether and how alternative forms of government intervention may affect wealth polariza-
tion. First, two types of lump-sum transfers which fail to eliminate wealth polarization, one for the
model described in Section 2.1 and one for the Shumpeterian version of Section 2.2, are discussed.
Thereafter, such a result is being even strengthen by showing that direct wealth taxation may actually
worsen polarization. In Section 5.2, however, we shall offer a fiscal solution based on random taxation
of the rich that may wipe out polarization, at least in the sense of “filling the gap” in the support of
a polarized invariant distribution. For simplicity, we will not assume that polarization/pulverization
implies productivity losses.
5.1 Lump-Sum Transfers
In the model of Section 2.1, let us assume that the gains from success are taxed at the end of each
period a proportion 0 ≤ τ < 1 and that proceeds are redistributed lump-sum to the unluckies.14 If all
individuals exert effort et in order to learn technology At, the steady state proportion of rich families
in the economy will still be p. Hence, the government in the long run will be able to collect tax
revenues equals to pτAt, which – assuming a balanced government budget every period – equals the
aggregate lump sum transfer received at the end of period t by the whole poor.
Since taxation further reduces the expected benefit derived from having the opportunity of adopt-
ing technology At, in order to let all individuals keep putting effort et even under taxation and thus
obtain a dynamic similar to that in (3), an upper bound on tax rate τ is needed. Let us discuss in
detail how Assumption 1 needs to be modified to avoid free riding behavior due to the possibility
of receiving, out of nothing, a transfer that generates a higher utility than the expected utility gain
produced by putting effort et.
Let 0 ≤ l ≤ 1 denote the fraction of the population who decides to put effort et in learning
technology At. Then, at the steady state, the total amount of tax revenues is plτAt, and each non-
successful individual i – which are both the unlucky ones who exerted effort et and the lazy ones who
did not exert any effort, that amount to a proportion 1− pl of families – receives a transfer given by
T it =
pl
1− pl
τAt. (26)
In view of (2), the individual i expected utility gain conditional to effort et is given by
E
[
U
(
Y it
)
|et
]
= ρ
[
p (1− τ)At + (1− p)T
i
t
]
− et
= ρ
[
p (1− τ)At + (1− p)
pl
1− pl
τAt
]
− et,
where ρ = (1− β)1−β ββ, while the individual i certain utility gain obtained by exerting zero effort
is given by
U
(
T it
)
= ρ
pl
1− pl
τAt.
14Note that, assuming lumps sum redistribution to all individuals – not only to the unluckies – would not alter the
qualitative results of our analysis.
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In order to let all the families put the effort et = γte0 required to learn technology At, we need
E
[
U
(
Y it
)
|et
]
> U
(
T it
)
to hold for all 0 ≤ l ≤ 1, which leads to(
1−
τ
1− pl
)
pρA0 > e0.
Since the minimum of the left hand side is reached for l = 1, then, for each given e0 satisfying
Assumption 1, the following restriction on parameter τ guarantees that all families will always put
effort et in learning technology At also under government taxation.
Assumption 3 Assumption 1 holds and
0 ≤ τ < (1− p)
(
1−
e0
pρA0
)
, (27)
where ρ = (1− β)1−β ββ.
Hence, in view of (3), the dynamics of individual i’s wealth becomes:
W it =
{
βW it−1 + p (1− p)
−1 τAt with probability 1− p
βW it−1 + (1− τ)At with probability p,
(28)
where p (1− p)−1 τAt represents the transfer received by a single unlucky family, i.e., T it in (26) with
l = 1. By dividing both equations in (28) by At we get productivity-adjusted linear dynamics:
wit =
{
(β/γ)wit−1 + p (1− p)
−1 τ with probability 1− p
(β/γ)wit−1 + (1− τ) with probability p.
(29)
Under Assumption 3, the RHS in (27) implies τ < 1 − p, which, in turn, implies p (1− p)−1 τ <
(1− τ). If we let α = β/γ, z1 = p (1− p)−1 τ and z2 = (1− τ), (29) becomes as in (19), which is
similar to (21), and thus the next result is established (see Remark 1).
Proposition 2 If γ > 2β, polarization/pulverization never disappears for all income tax rates τ
satisfying Assumption 3.
Figure 7 shows that only the common slope of the two maps constituting the IFS affects polariza-
tion/pulverization while lump-sum transfers – which are nothing else than additive constants – have
no effect in reducing inequality.
There is, however, an important difference with respect to the dynamics obtained in Section 2.1.
Observing the evolution through time of the supports of the marginal distributions νt of systems (28)
or (29), it is clear that the standard of living of the poor under wealth redistribution will be bounded
away from zero in the long run, that is, nobody will end up with a zero wealth in the steady state. As
a matter of fact, the feasible wealths of system (28) at time t lay in some subset of the interval[
βbi0 +
(
1− (β/γ)t+1
γ − β
)
γt+1p (1− p)−1 τA0, βb
i
0 +
(
1− (β/γ)t+1
γ − β
)
γt+1 (1− τ)A0
]
,
with left extremum strictly positive and increasing over time. Therefore, although government redis-
tribution does not affect polarization/pulverization, it still proves effective in sustaining the wealth of
the poor. Clearly also the “rich side” of the population is being affected by having a reduced – by
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FIGURE 7: redistribution from the rich to the poor has the only effect of shrinking the size of the gap, it does
not make it disappear.
factor (1− τ) – maximum possible wealth compared to that of the original feasible region (4). Thus,
the overall effect of a redistributive policy by the government is to narrow the whole absolute wealth
around its mean, without changing polarization/pulverization features in relative terms.
5.2 Government Purchase of Innovations
If the effort et required to promote innovation is sufficiently small, in the Shumpeterian model of
Section 2.2 the government could reward the innovator by purchasing the innovation and at the same
time make the innovation itself immediately publicly available to everybody.
Provided that population is normalized to 1, the society as a whole will put effort et in the R&D
for new technological projects and at the steady state there will be a fraction p of successful innovators
who possess technology At. Suppose that the government, in order to make technology At publicly
available in period t, buys the technological know-how from the p fraction of innovators at the lowest
incentive compatible price,15 i.e., at p−1et, and allows the fraction 1− p of unluckies to freely use it
in their own firms. Assume further that the government charges all the unluckies the whole cost et
of research through a lump-sum tax to be fully transferred to the luckies. Then, the law of motion of
wealth becomes:
W it =
{
βW it−1 + At − (1− p)
−1 et with probability 1− p
βW it−1 + At + p
−1et with probability p,
(30)
where (1− p)−1 et denotes the per capita cost of research charged to the unluckies and p−1et denotes
the per capita compensation for the productivity gain loss (9). We will assume e0 small enough to
15Note that any price slightly higher than p−1et makes each individual strictly better off undertaking the R&D effort.
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guarantee that the unluckies are better off under this forced purchase of the new technology than under
laissez faire.
Observe that, at least for the case p < 1/2, which seems sufficiently realistic, system (30) can be
reduced to system (7) – or (21) – through formula (20). Therefore, once again, Proposition 1 applies
stating that polarization/pulverization is completely determined by condition γ > 2β and a result
similar to Proposition 2 holds: government financing private innovations does not affect polarization/
pulverization.
The delicate part, as usual, is enforceability of such a policy: nobody would vote a government
who leaves everybody worse off under this program. The individual expected indirect utility gain is
E
[
U
(
Y it
)]
= ρ
[
p
(
At +
et
p
)
+ (1− p)
(
At −
et
1− p
)]
− et
= ρpAt − et,
and thus, the effort condition turns out to be the same as16 in Assumption 1:
e0 < ρpA0. (31)
Note that, by assuming p < 1/2, necessarily ρp < 1 − p, and thus (31) implies e0 < (1− p)A0,
which guarantees that the infimum of the support of the marginal probabilities of process (30), which
at time t is
βbi0 +
(
1− (β/γ)t+1
γ − β
)
γt+1
(
A0 −
e0
1− p
)
,
is strictly positive for all t. This means that, like in the previous section, the poorest segment of the
population improves its standards of living at the same steady rate γ − 1 as the richest.
5.3 Direct Wealth Taxation
Let us now consider wealth taxation (not redistributed lump-sum) for the model described in Section
2.1. If final wealth is taxed at a rate 0 < τw < 1, the dynamical system (5) becomes:
wit =
{
(1− τw) (β/γ)w
i
t−1 with probability 1− p
(1− τw) (β/γ)w
i
t−1 + (1− τw) with probability p
(32)
which, through the same argument used before, immediately implies the following result, as can be
easily established by letting α = (1− τw) (β/γ), z1 = 0 and z2 = 1 − τw, so that (32) is as in (19)
and thus similar to (21).
Proposition 3 Suppose Assumption 1 holds and 0 < τw < 1−(pρA0)−1 e0. Then, if γ > (1− τw) 2β,
polarization/pulverization emerges.
In this case, government intervention proves effective (for the worse) in modifying polariza-
tion/pulverization as it is capable of affecting the common slope of the maps of (5) – and so also
of (7) or (21) – rather than the additive constants. Therefore, a high enough wealth tax rate can gen-
erate a polarized wealth distribution even if γ < 2β, that is, even if growth and altruism are such that
that the private sector let alone does not generate polarization. In other words, somewhat paradoxi-
cally, in this model the middle class may disappear and the economy becomes polarized/pulverized
as a result of an active redistributive policy. Here, to isolate the pure effect of taxation, we have not
assumed any transfer from the government; recall, however, from Section 5.1, that any lump sum
transfer would not have any effect on wealth polarization.
16This seems to be reasonable since utility is linear and what is taken from the unluckies goes to the luckies, leaving
the expected utility gain unchanged.
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5.4 Random Taxation
We here show that a redistribution scheme based on random taxation may reduce and, in some cases,
even eliminate polarization.17 The idea is to increase the uncertainty in the model so that the two-
maps IFS (28) is being replaced by a three-maps IFS in which the image set of the second map might
fill the hole left by the other two images set in case of polarization.
In the framework developed in Section 2.1, let us assume that the gains from success are taxed
at some rate 0 < τ < 1 with probability 1 − q, with 0 < q < 1. At each period, the successful
individuals face a tax lottery such that they have to pay τAt with probability 1− q and 0 with proba-
bility q. Probability q is constant through time and is independent of the probability of success p. The
government controls parameters q and τ . The total amount of proceeds are redistributed lump-sum to
the unluckies.
If all individuals exert effort et in order to learn technology At, the steady state proportion of rich
families in the economy will still be p. A fraction q of this proportion will be tax exempt, while the
other fraction 1 − q will be taxed at rate τ . Hence, the government in the long run will be able to
collect tax revenues equals to
p (1− q) τAt,
which – assuming a balanced government budget every period – equals the aggregate lump sum
transfer received at the end of period t by the whole poor.
The dynamics of individual i wealth becomes:
W it =


βW it−1 +
p (1− q)
1− p
τAt with probability 1− p
βW it−1 + (1− τ)At with probability p (1− q)
βW it−1 + At with probability pq,
where, in the first line, p (1− p)−1 (1− q) τAt represents the transfer received by a single unlucky
family. Let α = β/γ and consider the productivity-adjusted dynamics:
wit =


f1
(
wit−1
)
= αwit−1 +
p (1− q)
1− p
τ with probability 1− p
f2
(
wit−1
)
= αwit−1 + (1− τ) with probability p (1− q)
f3
(
wit−1
)
= αwit−1 + 1 with probability pq.
(33)
System (33) contains three (affine) contractive maps identified by parameters α, p, q and τ , where the
last two are decision variables for the government. We want to investigate for what values of these
parameters 1) incentive compatibility holds, i.e., all individuals exert effort et, 2) the three maps are
ordered so that f1 < f2 < f3, and 3) whether values of the parameters exist so that the image set of f2
fills the (possible) gap left by the image sets of f1 and f3. The last point would mean the possibility
of eliminating possible polarization through government redistribution under this random scheme.
With no loss of generality for the rest of this section we shall assume
1
3
≤ α <
1
2
.
The right inequality implies that the two maps in (21) exhibit polarization (their images do not over-
lap), while the left inequality allows for the introduction of a third affine map with the same slope α
between the two given maps, so that the hole left by the two pre-existing image sets may be “filled”.
From figure 4(a), it is easily understood that maps with slope α < 1/3 have images sets which cannot
17We owe the idea of studying the effects of a random tax on polarization/pulverization to Salvador Ortigueira.
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fill the whole interval [0, 1]. Clearly, for maps with α < 1/3, arguments similar to the one carried
out in this section can be implemented for random taxation schemes that use different tax rates. For
example, if α < 1/n, n− 1 tax rates, each with positive probability, are necessary.
In order to let all individuals keep putting effort et even under taxation, an upper bound on the tax
rate τ similar to that in Assumption 3 is needed. By replacing the certain tax rate with the expected
rate tax (1− q) τ we are easily led to the following inequality:
τ <
1− p
1− q
(
1−
e0
pρA0
)
, (34)
where ρ = (1− β)1−β ββ. Moreover, in order to have f1 < f2
τ <
1− p
1− pq
must hold; while f2 < f3 follows from 0 < τ < 1. Hence, the following assumption is what we need.
Assumption 4 Assumption 1 holds and
0 < τ < min
{
1− p
1− q
(
1−
e0
pρA0
)
,
1− p
1− pq
}
,
where ρ = (1− β)1−β ββ.
To analyze the possibility of eliminating polarization, let us normalize the three maps IFS (33)
to the interval [0, 1] along the same argument as in Section 3.3. We shall apply formula (20) with
α = β/γ, z1 = p (1− p)
−1 (1− q) τ and z2 = 1 to get the lower and higher maps as in (21), while the
constant intercept of the map in the middle will be obtained by letting zj = (1− τ) in (20). Hence,
we get the normalized system
wit =


g1
(
wit−1
)
= αwit−1 with probability 1− p
g2
(
wit−1
)
= αwit−1 + (1− η) (1− α) with probability p (1− q)
g3
(
wit−1
)
= αwit−1 + (1− α) with probability pq,
(35)
where
η =
(1− p) τ
(1− p)− p (1− q) τ
.
Note that, under Assumption 4, 0 < η < 1.
The overlapping condition for the three image sets is a straightforward computation that leads to
1− 2α ≤ (1− α) η ≤ α,
which, in terms of τ , boils down to
(1− 2α) (1− p)
(1− p) (1− α) + (1− 2α) p (1− q)
≤ τ ≤
α (1− p)
(1− p) (1− α) + αp (1− q)
. (36)
Note that condition (36) is nonempty for 1/3 ≤ α < 1/2, and coincides with a single value for τ
when α = 1/3, that is when inequalities in (36) become equalities and there is only one map g2 in
(35) whose image set can fill the hole left by the other two.
The left hand side of condition (36) is the most important in our analysis: it requires τ to be
sufficiently large in order to eliminate polarization. However, in view of Assumption 4, we observe
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that τ must be not too large to let the incentive compatibility (34) be always satisfied. If this constraint
is too tight, due, e.g., to a high value of the ratio e0/ (pρA0), the left hand side in (36) might not hold,
thus leaving the government with no room for applying redistributive policies against polarization.18
Specifically, polarization is neglected if τ is chosen to be equal to the left hand side of (36) and
e0
pρA0
< 1−
(1− 2α) (1− q)
(1− p) (1− α) + (1− 2α) p (1− q)
. (37)
Note that we did not discuss any restrictions for the choice of parameter q by the government so
far. Since by Assumption 1 e0/ (pρA0) < 1, there always exist values for parameter q < 1, possibly
close to 1, such that (37) is satisfied. In other words, there is always room for the government to
eliminate polarization through a random taxation and lump-sum redistribution scheme in the sense
of making the support of the steady state distribution of system (35) to be the whole interval [0, 1].
However, values of q close to 1 imply that almost the whole p fraction of the steady state successful
population, i.e., pq out of p, is paying no taxes, while only a negligible fraction p (1− q) of the
successful population is paying taxes. But this amounts exactly to the “middle class” artificially
created through the random taxation. Therefore, as the new middle class carries nearly no weight,
polarization remains substantially unaltered in terms of “wealth distribution”, even if such distribution
has full support. That is, once again, a tight incentive compatibility constraint in Assumption 4 leaves
little room for government intervention and substantially reduces hopes of eliminating polarization
even through random taxation.
6 Inequality Versus Pulverization
So far we have used the term polarization to generically describe an extreme degree of inequality due
to the disappearance of a middle class in a distribution supported on a Cantor set (as in Definition
1). A more “technical” concept of polarization assumes, besides the inequality produced by different
wealth levels between groups, also a certain degree of concentration, or “clustering”, of wealth within
each group: if the distribution of wealth is highly gathered within groups but very diverse between
groups in a population, then wealth is considered “polarized” between the groups (see, e.g., [23],
[48] and, for a recent survey, [49]). In other words, the generation of tensions possibly evolving to
rebellion, revolt, or social unrest is more likely if wealth is distributed among groups which have a
strong self-identity feeling.
However, we have seen in the previous sections that the striking inequality phenomenon possibly
occurring after one period, the lack of a middle class, is being replicated on a smaller scale among
wealth sub-clusters after each iteration of any IFS similar to (21), provided that γ > 2β [see, e.g.,
figure 5]. In Section 4 we somewhat tentatively called “pulverization” such dispersion of wealth over
a Cantor set. Clearly, pulverization runs against polarization, since it may be seen as the result of a
progressive erosion of the wealth concentration around the two main clusters appeared after the first
period. In the limit, whenever the invariant distribution of wealth is supported over a Cantor set, all
wealth groups are distinct (a Cantor set is disconnected) and each of them bear zero weight (a Cantor
set has a continuum of points over which a unit mass is being spread, as we shall see in short).
All these considerations should be enough to discourage any attempt for providing meaningful
polarization measures for distributions supported on Cantor sets by means of any standard index
18Note that the other component of assumption A.4 is always satisfied since
(1− 2α) (1− p)
(1− p) (1− α) + (1− 2α) p (1− q)
<
1− p
1− pq
is always true.
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available in the literature. Nonetheless, in this section we aim at shading some light on whether
pulverization may or may not affect, if not – technically speaking – polarization, at least inequality
in the long run. Such goal is achieved by adapting the most popular inequality measure, the Gini
coefficient, to our invariant wealth distribution when it is supported on a Cantor set.
Formally, given a finite distribution of weights pi1, . . . , pin on wealths W1, . . . ,Wn, with pii,Wi >
0, the Gini coefficient is given by
G =
1
2µ
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
piipij |Wi −Wj| , (38)
where µ denotes the mean wealth across the whole sample. Clearly (38) is meant to measure in-
equality by using statistical data available for societies with finite populations. The pursue of some
generalization of (38) to include infinite distributions supported over fractal sets is well beyond the
scope of this paper. Our goal is more modest: we just aim at checking whether pulverization affects
inequality in the long run. For this purpose, the computation of the limit of G in (38) as n → ∞,
to see whether it remains positive or boils down to zero, should be sufficient. Such question is non
trivial, as two opposite effects occur by applying formula (38) directly to our IFS in the case of real
(i.e., not adjusted by productivity) wealth dynamics: on one hand, the weights pii decrease after each
step, since, under our assumptions, the same unit population is being progressively spread over more
and more wealth clusters, and the same does the reciprocal of the mean, 1/µ; on the other hand, after
each period new wealth groups Wi are born and the distances between wealth clusters increase, thus
raising both the number of addends in the sum and the values |Wi −Wj|.
Consider the dynamical system (3) discussed in Section 2.1:
Wt =
{
βWt−1 with probability 1− p
βWt−1 + At with probability p,
(39)
where Wt denotes some wealth amount at time t, 0 < β < 1 is the degree of intergenerational
altruism, At = γtA0 is the exogenous technology with A0 > 0, γ > 1, and 0 < p < 1 represents the
probability of success in the adoption of the technology. The choice of studying system (39) instead
of system (7) – which is normalized on the interval [0, 1] – is made to conform with the mainstream
literature on inequality, where real wealth values available from statistical data are used, instead of
productivity adjusted values.
Theorem 1 cannot be applied directly to the IFS (39), which has unbounded support for t → ∞,
however we can refer to the invariant distribution of the conjugate system (7) as the equivalent of the
unique invariant distribution of (39) defined on the positive real line.19 The system converges to this
distribution starting from any initial distribution of wealths. Thus, for convenience, we may assume
that the distribution at time t = 0 concentrates a mass 1 − p on some bequest b0 ≥ 0 inherited from
the past and a mass p on (b0 + A0); that is, ν0 (W ) = (1− p) δb0 (W )+ pδb0+A0 (W ), where, for any
b ∈ R+, δb denotes the Dirac function:
δb (W ) =
{
1 if W = b
0 otherwise.
We may also write the initial condition for (39) as
W0 =
{
b0 with probability 1− p
b0 + A0 with probability p.
(40)
19Alternatively, since 0 < β < 1, one may invoke Theorem 7.2 in Lasota [33] to prove existence and uniqueness of the
invariant distribution for IFS (39).
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Having an initial distribution concentrating masses over a finite set of points implies that also the
distribution of wealths at each date t > 0 concentrates masses over finite sets of points. This allows
a direct application of formula (38) to the distribution of wealths at each date t. By construction, it
is easily seen that, for all t ≥ 0, the are 2t+1 values of wealth W 1t , . . . ,W 2
t+1
t each with weight piit,
i = 1, . . . , 2t+1. Therefore, the Gini coefficient at time t is given by
Gt =
1
2µt
2t+1∑
i=1
2t+1∑
j=1
piitpi
j
t
∣∣W it −W jt ∣∣ , (41)
where
µt =
2t+1∑
i=1
piitW
i
t (42)
denotes the mean of the marginal distribution νt for all t ≥ 0, and, in view of (40), we may let W 10 =
b0, W
2
0 = (b0 + A0), pi
1
0 = 1− p and pi20 = p.
Since, by independence, for all t ≥ 0, weights piit have the form
piit = p
hi (1− p)t+1−hi , 0 ≤ hi ≤ t+ 1, 0 < p < 1,
clearly limt→∞ piitpi
j
t = 0; in other words, masses p and 1 − p, initially concentrated on b0 and
(b0 + A0), are progressively spread over a set of points that eventually converge to a continuum of
points and thus vanish in the limit.
Next result shows that pulverization does not annihilate inequality.
Proposition 4 The limiting wealth distribution of the model discussed in Section 2.1 has positive Gini
coefficient for all feasible values of parameters β, p, γ, b0 and A0 such that γ > 2β; specifically,
lim
t→∞
Gt =
(γ − β) (1− p)
γ −
[
(1− p)2 + p2
]
β
> 0.
The proof is reported in the Appendix after some preliminary lemmas.
Proposition 4 states that, under the assumptions of Proposition 1, a unit weight progressively
spread over (finite) sets of points that exponentially converge to a Cantor like set preserves inequality
also in the limit whenever inequality is measured by the limit of the Gini coefficient for the finite
marginal distributions. Note that such result holds for a constant (unit) population; clearly, we can
conjecture that some even stronger result should hold under the assumption of population growth, in
which case a similar analysis might be carried out by means of some appropriate polarization index.
We leave such investigation for future research.
7 More General Processes
It is clear from section 3 that the extreme version of polarization/pulverization envisaged by Definition
1 heavily relies on the assumption of having only two states of nature; as a matter of fact, it is crucial in
letting the best outcome under the low realization to be worse than the worst outcome under the high
realization when the growth rate is large enough. The latter phenomenon quickly disappears as one
allows for more realizations: the more the number of probabilistic realizations, the greater the chances
that the range of the corresponding maps in the IFS will overlap. In other words, more ‘degrees of
success’ translates into a IFS with a larger number of maps, which, in turn, would fill the holes left
on the support of the marginal distributions by the iterations of only two maps, g1 and g2 in figure 4,
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thus yielding a full support, X = [0, 1], for the invariant distribution. In such circumstances, neither
“pulverized limits” or “disconnection” can appear, even if the overlap is only across neighboring pairs
of maps (one for each realization) and not across the worst and best outcome.
Thus, all the main points of the model seem to rely on assumptions that are extremely special.
Hence, we need to check economic relevance of our arguments in a more realistic scenario. To test
robustness of our approach consider the perturbed system obtained by adding some ‘noise’ ε to the
usual IFS (21):
yt+1 = gεt (yt) = αyt + εt, (43)
where {εt}∞t=0 is a i.i.d. stochastic process such that εt has a constant density supported on the com-
pact interval [0, 1− α]. The autoregressive process (43) extends our model to a completely different
setting: from only two states – ‘failure’ or ‘success’ – we shifted to a continuum of states governing
the affine maps of the IFS, all placed between the original maps g1, g2, which maintain their position
on the boundaries of the interval [0, 1− α], i.e., g1 (y) = αy + ε when ε = 0 and g2 (y) = αy + ε for
ε = 1 − α. In order to keep the basic traits of the economic models – societies that highly rewards
success – discussed in the previous sections, we need to assume a bimodal density for the random
variable εt; specifically, a density that concentrates most of the mass around the two extrema ε = 0
and ε = 1− α – i.e., on the two ‘boundary’ maps g1 and g2.
As an example, we may consider the density defined by
f (ε) =
(1− p) e−ε/σ + pe[ε−(1−α)]/σ
σ [1− e−(1−α)/σ]
, (44)
where p and α are the same as in the previous sections and parameter σ controls its dispersion around
the two boundaries ε = 0 and ε = 1− α: f (ε) becomes more concentrated around them for smaller
values of parameter σ. Figure 8 shows that, for α = 1/3 and p = 1/3, if σ = 0.01, f (ε) is more
concentrated on the boundaries than for σ = 0.1.
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(a) α = 1/3, p = 1/3 and σ = 0.1
ε
f
0 0.2 0.4 0.6
20
40
60
(b) α = 1/3, p = 1/3 and σ = 0.01
FIGURE 8: two examples of f (ε) defined as in (44) for different values of σ.
We are now in the position to provide at least some heuristic argument supporting our conjecture
that – a softer than that of Definition 1, but still meaningful, notion of – polarization/pulverization is
not only implied by the (extreme) assumption of having only two realizations, but rather the conse-
quence of a strongly bimodal stylization of luck in a variety of frameworks, regardless of the process
being discrete or continuous.
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The Foias operator analogous to (14) when the marginal probabilities of the IFS yt+1 = gε (yt)
are absolutely continuous and when the maps gε themselves are governed by a density f (ε) can be
written as follows (see Appendix B):
Mdν (y) =
∫ 1−α
0
χ[0,1]
[
g−1ε (y)
]
ν
[
g−1ε (y)
] ∂
∂y
g−1ε (y) f (ε) dε, (45)
where ν is a density on [0, 1] and g−1ε (y) ∈ [0, 1] denotes the preimage of y ∈ [0, 1] through gε for
each ε ∈ [0, 1− α] and χA (·) is the indicator function for the set A – its role in (45) is to let ν (·) ≡ 0
outside the interval [0, 1]. It is easily seen that Md maps densities on [0, 1] into densities on [0, 1];
specifically, Mdν (y) is the density associated to each point y ∈ [0, 1] after one iteration of the IFS
starting from a density ν on [0, 1].
By invoking Theorem 1.1 in Diaconis and Freedman [21] (see also Section 6.1, p. 64, of the
same paper), it can be shown that the sequence of marginal densities νt = Md
(
M t−1d νt−1
)
= M tdν0
converges weakly to a unique invariant density ν∗ – such that ν∗ = Mdν∗ – starting from any density
ν0 on [0, 1], provided that all gε are Lipschitz with Lipschitz constants Kε satisfying the following
“average contraction” condition: ∫ 1−α
0
lnKεf (ε) dε < 0. (46)
In other words, Theorem 1.1 in [21] generalizes Theorem 1 reported in Section 3.1 to IFS constituted
by infinitely many maps (see also the references reported there).
Since Kε ≡ α < 1 for all ε ∈ [0, 1− α], property (46) certainly holds for the IFS yt+1 = αyt + ε
defined in (43), which thus has a unique invariant density ν∗. By using the change of variable formula
(see Appendix B), (45) becomes
Mdν (y) =
∫ min{y/α,1}
max{1−(1−y)/α,0}
ν (x) f (y − αx) dx, (47)
which can be approximated by numerical methods.
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d
as in (47) for α = 1/3, p = 1/3, σ = 0.01
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(b) M6 as in (14) for α = 1/3, p = 1/3
FIGURE 9: first six iterations of Foias operator starting from the uniform density; a) IFS with a continuum of
maps with density f (ε) defined in (44), b) IFS with only two maps g1, g2 of the type (21).
Figure 9(a) approximates the first six iterations of Foias operatorMd as defined in (47) for α = 1/3
and f (ε) as in (44) with p = 1/3 and σ = 0.01 starting from the uniform density. This is achieved
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by numerical integration20 over a partition of 500 subintervals of [0, 1]. Recall that Foias operator
converges at a geometric rate, therefore figure 9(a) provides a reliable picture of what the invariant
density ν∗ might look like. Even if it is a density, it clearly exhibits a pattern very similar to the
distribution in figure 9(b), which is the same as figure 5(f), where the first six iteration of the Foias
operator in the case of the IFS with only two maps – g1 with probability 1− p and g2 with probability
p – is plotted. Not only a lack of the middle class, but also the replication of the same phenomenon
at smaller scale in each cluster of wealth after each iteration appear. Clearly, in figure 9(a) peaks
are shorter (below 10) than those in figure 9(b) (up to 64); also, self similarity on smaller scale
tends to blur in figure 9(a), due to the smoothing of the density f around the two ‘boundary’ maps
corresponding to the former g1 and g2 after each iteration. At any rate, however, the distributions
portrayed in figures 9(a) and 9(b) respectively exhibit very close qualitative traits, at least in terms of
– a broader meaning of – polarization/pulverization.
Figure 10 shows the same first six iterations of Md starting from the uniform density as in figure
9(a) but with a density f (ε) more dispersed around the boundaries ε = 0 and ε = 1−α, characterized
by σ = 0.1 [see figure 8(a)]. It is remarkable that also when ‘success’ is more evenly distributed, less
weight on intermediate degrees of success still translates into some degree of wealth polarization due
to a smaller middle class – corresponding to the large hollow in the middle of the graph – compared to
the poor and the rich. Our conjecture is that a more general notion of wealth inequality, determined
by a smaller size for the middle class with respect to the poor and the rich, is a direct consequence of
assuming a bimodal distribution of success. This will be the topic of future research.
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FIGURE 10: first six iterations of Md as in (47) starting from the uniform density in case of a IFS with a
continuum of maps with density f (ε) as in (44) for α = 1/3, p = 1/3, σ = 0.1.
8 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have pointed out how wealth polarization/pulverization is not to be contrasted with
equal opportunities characterizing economies with a high degree of social mobility, but instead it
can be exactly the effect of a large amplitude of mobility itself. What really matters for polariza-
tion/pulverization is the reward from being successful, which is increasing in the size of the techno-
logical jump. Private investment in the human capital necessary to adopt an exogenous innovation
stream can be one cause; private investment in research aimed at improving everybody’s productivity
can be another cause. Despite the differences between these two engines of growth, both induce the
disappearance of the middle class due to the fractal properties of the support of the invariant wealth
distribution, provided that the growth rate of the economy is higher than a common threshold.
20The Maple code that generates plots like in figure 9(a) and figure 10 is available from the authors upon request.
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We have shown that in this framework polarization and pulverization cannot be eliminated by fis-
cal measures such as wealth redistribution through taxation of the successful people with tax revenues
lump-sum redistributed to the unsuccessful ones, while wealth taxation can even create polarization.
Some more sophisticated device is required. A random taxation scheme may be able to reintroduce an
artificial middle class, but unlikely gives it enough strength, especially if the incentive compatibility
constraint is tight.
Hence, there seems to be a general lesson one can learn from the direct relationship between high
growth rates and inequality emerged by applying the IFS approach to wealth dynamics in a society
characterized by equal opportunities and fast social mobility: the goal of containing inequality may be
better achieved through policies aimed at tackling the growth rate itself – e.g., by means of monetary
policies devised to “cool down” the economy – rather than resorting on redistributive devices.
In view of recent works on optimal growth theory (see, e.g., [36] and [37]), further investigation
on wealth inequality may be pursued by means of models characterized by an infinitely lived repre-
sentative agent, as well as models whose wealth dynamics can be described by non-linear IFS – note
that the second part of our Definition 1 is readily applicable to such cases.
Also IFS with state-dependent probabilities might be worth considering, as they can introduce a
“damping effect” on social mobility – for example through a higher probability for both the poor and
the rich to remain in the same wealth cluster and a lower probability to switch from one class to the
other – which may seem closer to reality. For example, the poor might find educational costs unbear-
able or access to credit market precluded, thus indirectly reducing their probability of success, while
for the rich an easier access to education and credit markets improves their probability of being rich
also in the future. These observations suggest that models on wealth inequality from the traditional
stream of research, like the ones in [27] or in [1] (see also the whole literature cited in the intro-
duction), which assume imperfect capital markets, may easily fit our framework with the necessary
modifications.
Appendix
A Gini Coefficient and Cantor-like sets
This appendix is devoted to the proof of Proposition 4 in Section 6. Since both wealths W it and
weights piit have a recursive formulation generated by dynamic (39), it is convenient to write formula
(41) in a form more suitable for direct handling.
Lemma 1 For each t ≥ 0, label the set of wealths so that they are ordered: W 1t < W 2t < · · · <
W 2
t+1
t . Then formula (41) can be rewritten as follows:
Gt =
1
µt
2t+1−1∑
j=1
2t+1∑
i=1+j
piitpi
j
t
(
W it −W
j
t
)
, (48)
where µt is given by (42).
Proof. If the initial condition for system (39) is given by (40), in the sum (41) there are (2t+1 − 1) 2t
non-zero addends of the form
∣∣W it −W jt ∣∣, with i 6= j, and each of them is counted twice. By sum-
ming up all ordered non-zero differences W it −W
j
t , with W it > W
j
t , we get
Gt =
1
2µt
[
2
2t+1−1∑
j=1
2t+1∑
i=1+j
piitpi
j
t
(
W it −W
j
t
)]
,
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which is (48).
It is convenient to label the sum on the RHS of (48) by Dt, so we can use the shorthand
Gt =
Dt
µt
.
The next three lemmas provide a recursive formulation for both the mean µt and the sum Dt which
allow to compute Gt directly in terms of parameters and initial conditions.
Lemma 2 The mean µt has the following recursive formulation:
µt+1 = βµt + pAt+1, (49)
thus,
µt = β
tb0 +
1− (β/γ)t+1
γ − β
γt+1pA0. (50)
Proof. The construction of the tth marginal distribution νt through system (39) implies that each
point W it with associated weight piit at time t is being split into two wealth values W
iL
t+1 = βW
i
t and
W iUt+1 = βW
i
t + At+1 with weights pi
iL
t+1 = (1− p)pi
i
t and pi
iU
t+1 = ppi
i
t respectively at time t + 1, for
i = 1, . . . , 2t+1. Therefore, all 2t+2 terms in the sum defining µt+1 as in (42) can be grouped into
2t+1 pairs, each of them generated by a single term in the sum defining µt; thus all such pairs can be
written as functions of W it and piit as follows:
µt+1 =
2t+2∑
i=1
piit+1W
i
t+1 =
2t+1∑
iL=1
2t+1∑
iU=1
(
piiLt+1W
iL
t+1 + pi
iU
t+1W
iU
t+1
)
=
2t+1∑
iL=1
piiLt+1W
iL
t+1 +
2t+1∑
iU =1
piiUt+1W
iU
t+1
=
2t+1∑
i=1
(1− p) piitβW
i
t +
2t+1∑
i=1
ppiit
(
βW it + At+1
)
=
2t+1∑
i=1
[
(1− p) piitβW
i
t + ppi
i
t
(
βW it + At+1
)]
=
2t+1∑
i=1
piitβW
i
t + pAt+1
2t+1∑
i=1
piit = βµt + pAt+1,
where in the second and third equalities we have indexed by iL terms of the type piiLt+1W
iL
t+1 =
(1− p)piitβW
i
t (corresponding to the lower branch of a term piitW it in t) and by iU terms of the type
piiUt+1W
iU
t+1 = ppi
i
t (βW
i
t + At+1) (corresponding to the upper branch of a term piitW it in t), while in the
last equality
∑2t+1
i=1 pi
i
t = 1 holds, as population is normalized to 1. Hence, (49) is established, and, as
µ0 = b0 + pA0, (50) follows accordingly.
Before giving a recursive formula for Dt, we need the following lemma which states that, under
the assumption that a middle class disappears after one iteration of (39) as prescribed by Proposition
1, the poorest individual at time t which is successful at time t + 1 becomes richer than the richest
individual at time t which is not successful at time t + 1. Recall that, under the (ordered) labeling as
in Lemma 1, W 1t and W 2
t+1
t denote the smallest and the largest wealth at time t respectively.
Lemma 3 Let W 1Ut+1 = βW 1t +At+1 denote the wealth of the individual which is the poorest at time t
but becomes successful at time t + 1 and W 2t+1Lt+1 = βW 2t+1t denote the wealth of the individual which
is the richest at time t but becomes unsuccessful at time t+ 1. Then, if γ > 2β, W 1Ut+1 > W 2
t+2
L
t+1 for all
t ≥ 0.
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Proof. It is easily seen that W 1t = βtb0 and W 2
t+1
t = β
tb0 + (γ − β)
−1 [1− (β/γ)t+1] γt+1A0.
Hence,
W 1Ut+1 = β
t+1b0 + γ
t+1A0
> βt+1b0 + β
1− (β/γ)t+1
γ − β
γt+1A0 = β
[
βtb0 +
1− (β/γ)t+1
γ − β
γt+1A0
]
= W
2t+2
L
t+1 ,
where the inequality follows from γ > 2β.
An immediate consequence of Lemma 3 is the following Corollary.
Corollary 1 Under the assumption γ > 2β, ifW it > W jt , thenW jUt+1 = βW jt +At+1 andW iLt+1 = βW it
are such that W jUt+1 >W
iL
t+1.
Lemma 4 Under the assumption γ > 2β the sum
Dt =
2t+1−1∑
j=1
2t+1∑
i=1+j
piitpi
j
t
(
W it −W
j
t
) (51)
in (48) has the following recursive formulation:
Dt+1 =
[
(1− p)2 + p2
]
βDt + p (1− p)At+1, (52)
thus,
Dt =
1− (s/γ)t+1
γ − s
γt+1p (1− p)A0, (53)
where s =
[
(1− p)2 + p2
]
β.
Proof. We follow an argument parallel to that in the proof of Lemma 2. For j = 1, . . . , 2t+1 − 1
and i = 1 + j, . . . , 2t+1, each addend piitpi
j
t
(
W it −W
j
t
)
in (51) at time t contains two wealth values,
W it and W
j
t , such that W it > W
j
t , with associated weights piit and pi
j
t respectively. The construction of
the tth marginal distribution νt through system (39) implies that both such terms are being split into
two wealth values at time t+ 1, for a total of four terms, that we can label as follows:
W jLt+1 = βW
j
t with weight pi
jL
t+1 = (1− p)pi
j
t ,
W jUt+1 = βW
j
t + At+1 with weight pi
jU
t+1 = ppi
j
t ,
W iLt+1 = βW
i
t with weight pi
iL
t+1 = (1− p)pi
i
t,
W iUt+1 = βW
i
t + At+1 with weight pi
iU
t+1 = ppi
i
t.
Hence, each addend piitpi
j
t
(
W it −W
j
t
)
in Dt at time t corresponds to the following (22 − 1) 2 = 6
positive addends in Dt+1 at time t + 1:
piiLt+1pi
jL
t+1
(
W iLt+1 −W
jL
t+1
)
= (1− p)2 piitpi
j
tβ
(
W it −W
j
t
)
pijUt+1pi
jL
t+1
(
W jUt+1 −W
jL
t+1
)
= (1− p) p
(
pijt
)2
At+1
piiUt+1pi
jL
t+1
(
W iUt+1 −W
jL
t+1
)
= (1− p) ppiitpi
j
t
[
β
(
W it −W
j
t
)
+ At+1
]
pijUt+1pi
iL
t+1
(
W jUt+1 −W
iL
t+1
)
= (1− p) ppiitpi
j
t
[
β
(
W jt −W
i
t
)
+ At+1
]
piiUt+1pi
iL
t+1
(
W iUt+1 −W
iL
t+1
)
= (1− p) p (piit)
2
At+1
piiUt+1pi
jU
t+1
(
W iUt+1 −W
jU
t+1
)
= p2piitpi
j
tβ
(
W it −W
j
t
)
,
(54)
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each of them defined as functions of W it , W
j
t , pi
i
t and pi
j
t . Note that all such terms are positive provided
that γ > 2β, which, by Corollary 1, guarantees that also the fourth term (on the LHS of the equation)
is positive.
Therefore, all (2t+2 − 1) 2t+1 terms in the sum defining Dt+1 as in (51) can be gathered into
(2t+1 − 1) 2t groups of six addends, with each group generated by a single term in the sum defining
Dt, as follows:
Dt+1 =
2t+2−1∑
j=1
2t+2∑
i=1+j
piit+1pi
j
t+1
(
W it+1 −W
j
t+1
)
=
2t+1−1∑
jL=1
2t+1∑
iL=1+jL
piiLt+1pi
jL
t+1
(
W iLt+1 −W
jL
t+1
)
+
2t+1−1∑
jL=1
2t+1∑
jU=1+jL
pijUt+1pi
jL
t+1
(
W jUt+1 −W
jL
t+1
)
+
2t+1−1∑
jL=1
2t+1∑
iU=1+jL
piiUt+1pi
jL
t+1
(
W iUt+1 −W
jL
t+1
)
+
2t+1−1∑
iL=1
2t+1∑
jU=1+iL
pijUt+1pi
iL
t+1
(
W jUt+1 −W
iL
t+1
)
+
2t+1−1∑
iL=1
2t+1∑
iU=1+iL
piiUt+1pi
iL
t+1
(
W iUt+1 −W
iL
t+1
)
+
2t+1−1∑
jU=1
2t+1∑
iU=1+jU
piiUt+1pi
jU
t+1
(
W iUt+1 −W
jU
t+1
)
=
[
(1− p)2 + p2
]
β
2t+1−1∑
j=1
2t+1∑
i=1+j
piitpi
j
t
(
W it −W
j
t
)
+ p (1− p)At+1
[
2t+1∑
k=1
(
pikt
)2
+ 2
2t+1−1∑
j=1
2t+1∑
i=1+j
piitpi
j
t
]
=
[
(1− p)2 + p2
]
βDt + p (1− p)At+1,
where in the second to the sixth lines we have substituted terms as in (54) and simplified terms, while
the last line holds since pikt s add up to 1 and
2t+1∑
k=1
(
pikt
)2
+ 2
2t+1−1∑
j=1
2t+1∑
i=1+j
piitpi
j
t =
(
2t+1∑
k=1
pikt
)2
= 1.
Hence, (52) is established, and, since G0 = p (1− p)A0, (53) follows accordingly.
Proof of Proposition 4. By Lemmas 1 – 4,
lim
t→∞
Gt = lim
t→∞
Dt
µt
= lim
t→∞
1− (s/γ)t+1
γ − s
γt+1p (1− p)A0
βtb0 +
1− (β/γ)t+1
γ − β
γt+1pA0
=
(γ − β) (1− p)
γ −
[
(1− p)2 + p2
]
β
,
where s =
[
(1− p)2 + p2
]
β, and the proof is complete.
B The Foias Operator for Densities
We first construct formula (45) for the Foias operator when the IFS is of the kind (43), gε (y) = αy+ε,
that is, it has a continuum of maps each chosen by means of a density f (ε) on the interval interval
[0, 1− α].
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If X and Y denote two random variables with densities ν and Mdν on [0, 1] respectively, then:
Pr (Y ∈ B) =
∫ 1−α
0
Pr
[
X ∈ g−1ε (B)
]
f (ε) dε.
For B = [0, y] this is equivalent to
∫ y
0
Mdν (u) du =
∫ 1−α
0
χ[0,1]
[
g−1ε (y)
] ∫ g−1ε (y)
g−1ε (0)
ν (u) f (ε) dudε,
which, since Mdν (y) = (∂/∂y)
∫ y
0
Mdν (u) du, leads to
Mdν (y) =
∂
∂y
∫ 1−α
0
χ[0,1]
[
g−1ε (y)
] ∫ g−1ε (y)
g−1ε (0)
ν (u) f (ε) dudε
=
∫ 1−α
0
χ[0,1]
[
g−1ε (y)
] [ ∂
∂y
∫ g−1ε (y)
g−1ε (0)
ν (u) du
]
f (ε) dε,
which is (45).
Noting that (∂/∂y) g−1ε (y) ≡ 1/α for all ε ∈ [0, 1− α] and by using the change of variable
x = g−1ε (y) = (y − ε) /α, which is a strictly decreasing transformation of variable ε, (45) can easily
be transformed into (47):
Mdν (y) =
1
α
∫ 1−α
0
χ[0,1]
[
g−1ε (y)
]
ν
[
g−1ε (y)
]
f (ε) dε
=
1
α
∫ y/α
1−(1−y)/α
χ[0,1] (x) ν (x) f (y − αx)αdx
=
∫ y/α
1−(1−y)/α
χ[0,1] (x) ν (x) f (y − αx) dx
=
∫ min{y/α,1}
max{1−(1−y)/α,0}
ν (x) f (y − αx) dx,
where in the last equality we translated the bounds given by the indicator χ[0,1] (·) into the limits of
integration.
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